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Abstract
Investors in ventures that threaten to disrupt the markets of incumbents can use the options
markets to add value to their investments by purchasing put options on the stock of the disrupted
rivals on the basis of their asymmetric knowledge. By making a profit on these derivative trades in
the stock of the disrupted firms, the investor innovator is able to recapture from the market extra and
immediate profits (equivalent to the value of the consumer surplus) generated by the innovation.
These additional profits increase the incentive of investors to invest in disruptive ventures and so
correct biases that have been observed against investing disruptive innovation. Our paper provides
guidance as to how these effects arise and their value. It also explores the ethical, regulatory and
practical constraints on undertaking the trades, pointing out that it is effective and the legality seems
to be robust provided certain conditions are met.
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1. Executive Summary
The returns to venture finance are skewed and uncertain. Research in this journal
suggests that most new ventures fail and overall less than 1 in 10 new ventures make a
positive return (Mason and Harrison, 2002; Mainigart et al., 2002; Kleiman and
Shulman, 1992; Bygrave, 1989). The fact that so many investments fail makes it hard for
would-be entrepreneurs with good propositions to attract seed money. We explore how
would-be investors can increase the returns on their portfolios by making subsequent
investments that are correlated to the activities of their initial investments. What at first
sight may seem to be an exclusively financial strategy holds great importance for
entrepreneurs, as it increases the availability and willingness of financiers to invest in
new ventures.
The central idea is that the venture investor can take advantage of potentially valuable
asymmetric information about the actions of the firms in which they have invested
(Aboody and Lev, 2000). This information relates to the timing and potential efficacy of
the effect of the invested firm’s actions on its established rivals. For example, the firm may
be a new entrant that is about to launch a product that satisfies market requirements better
at a considerable discount to current market pricing. Such actions have the potential to
change the competitive landscape and so reduce the value of established rival firms. When
those rival firms are quoted and traded, the venture financier can capture additional value
by trading in financial options in the rivals’ stock.
Let us explain the situation more clearly. We are concerned with the subset of all new
businesses that directly threaten well-established rivals. This is a broad class of situations
that we call bdisruptiveQ and is far more extensive than the narrow class of technologically
disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997). New businesses that could disrupt competitors
in established markets have difficulties in finding investment. This is because investors
and entrepreneurs are legitimately concerned that the well-established rivals may react
aggressively in retaliation (see McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). Even though consumers
may benefit from the disruption because of better products, better services, or lower prices,
gains from investments in disrupting firms may be elusive. Our paper notes that investors
in these bdisruptingQ innovations can be more positive towards their investments because
they can capitalise on how financial markets react to threats, even when the actual event is
distant. By taking certain actions early on in the investing process, investors in the new
venture can raise the returns on their investment.
The sequence of events is broadly as follows. Armed with the knowledge of the
situation of the disrupting firm in which it has a stake, the first step for the investor is to
establish the rights to trade. The investor does this by adding to their investment bterm
sheetsQ explicit information rights permitting them to utilize any information learned about
unrelated third parties as a result of their investment in the firm. The investor then goes
about exploiting the information. It first identifies which third-party firms will be
adversely affected by the disruptive company’s innovation. Shortly before the innovator
firm disrupts the identified third-party firms’ markets, the venture financier purchases put
options (or similar derivative instruments with equivalent effects) on these rival firms
before the impact of the knowledge of the disrupting firm is widely known or appreciated.
In due course, the disrupting firm will announce that its product-process and/or market
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penetration has progressed to the point where its deleterious effects on the future profits of
the rivals are obvious to the investing public. As the financial markets integrate this
information, the rivals’ stock prices will fall. The investor is then able to exercise the
options (cash-in the derivatives) at a profit.
Only cetain ventures fit the demanding criteria of this paper. We are only dealing with
innovations that are capable of influencing market structures and stock prices of rivals.
Although there is no requirement that the firm that is causing the disruption is listed for the
strategy to work, the stock of the threatened firm (the bdisrupted firmQ) must be traded in
well-developed financial markets. Since a large proportion of the US and European
economies are populated by quoted firms, and a significant goal of venture financiers is to
capture the maximum profit from the rights and preferences negotiated into their
investments, our paper has potentially a wide applicability.
We begin the paper by examining the critically important ethical question of whether
the strategy has the potential to increase public welfare as well as the purse of the investor.
We discuss at some length regulatory and institutional issues. We refer to legal journals
and US Supreme Court decisions to show that, in general, our strategies do not appear to
fall foul of SEC and other regulatory rules. Our analysis also discusses the transaction
costs of the proposed strategies, the impact of stock price volatility, and issues of timing.
2. Introduction and Background literature
There is a substantial literature on the use of asymmetric information possessed by
managers when they trade in the stock of their own firms for personal gain: such activities
are typically labeled insider trading or trading on private information. The extensive
discussion that appears in the finance, economics and management journals generally
concludes that the welfare gains to such behaviour are related to making information in
markets more efficient (see for instance Manne, 1966; Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994; Hu
and Noe, 2001). Recent papers have gone further and have questioned whether there are
any systematic losers from trading based on asymmetric information because markets are
friction-laden. Such work has typically used real data in real markets (e.g. Pagno and
Roell, 1966; Jeng et al., 1999). This work in no way denies that there will be specific
losers in particular trades, but rather that writers of option contracts do not lose overall in
the long run. Despite these papers, the legal position is that insider trading is outlawed in
most developed economies.
Our case here is quite different: we are considering the use of what is technically known
as trading in stock substitutes, that is, the use of information that one investor possesses
from his relationship with a firm in which he/she has invested that affects the stock price of
another legally and institutionally unrelated firm. Diligent enquiry and a wide search have
indicated that this dimension has only rarely been discussed, and then only in the law
journals rather than those relating to finance and strategy (Ayres and Bankman, 2001).
This literature has stressed the cases where the information may have been gained in
dubious circumstances and has ignored the situation of investors in disruptive innovations
getting information legitimately through their corporate governance exposure and
diligence related to the firms in which they have invested.
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In this opening section, we wish to focus attention on the (economic) welfare
implications of investors in disruptively innovating firms trading in stock substitutes.
Because the proposed trading strategies might be considered controversial, it is appropriate
that this question be dealt with at the very start of the paper and not consigned to an
endnote. Because the question is technical, we use the economists’ tool kit as a way of
considering questions of welfare and values.
Economists have often argued that investors in innovations need some protection. The
argument is usually portrayed in the context of defending patent laws. Here we deploy the
argument to defend our trading strategy. Our argument also allows us to measure quite
precisely the gains involved and connect these gains to the welfare issues. We start with
the discussion of the causes of the poor returns to innovation set out by the Nobel Laureate
Kenneth Arrow (1962). He pointed out the paradoxically destructive role played by
competition. When a firm introduces disruptive innovation that threatens the survival of
competitors, subsequent competition can force down prices and reduce the profits
available to the innovator. The threat is greatest when the innovator has no patents and
cannot erect entry barriers. The competition can come from existing firms or new firms
that respond to the innovation. Competition, normally considered to be a blessing for
consumer welfare, can be adverse because the investor may not be able to capture the
returns to the innovation fully, even when the innovation is bsocially desirableQ. Arrow
showed that this danger would discourage investment in many radical innovations and
consequently the innovation may not be launched. The argument relied on a careful
analysis of consumer surplus.
The problem that Arrow identified can be overcome in part or in full if inventors can
make direct contracts with customers in advance. Customers can promise to the inventor
that s/he will receive his/her rewards either directly through purchase contracts at a pre-
determined price, or by side payments. Von Hippel (1986) has pointed out that in many
producer goods markets, such contracting does occur on either a formal or an informal
basis. Hirshleifer (1961) has pointed to other ways of getting at the consumer benefit: the
innovator can make contracts with the suppliers of complementary goods to make the
gains. Thus he argued that Eli Witney, the inventor of the cotton gin, would have made
exceptional profits if he had abandoned his attempts to patent the machine and instead
focused attention on investment substitutes by buying up land suitable for raising cotton,
which, at the time, was trading at very low prices.
Our proposed strategy for investors is another way around the problem identified by
Arrow (1962). Investors who hold stock in the disrupting firm trade in the stock of the
unrelated disrupted firms. Our strategy therefore builds on a long line of discussion about
how investors in innovations can improve their returns with ingenious strategies.
3. The model
3.1. The assumptions
Consumer surplus is a concept invented by Alfred Marshall that measures the
difference between the amount that consumers might be willing to pay (the value) and the
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amount that they actually pay (the market price). To show simply how this concept is used,
let us go back to Arrow (1962). He explained that most innovators see poor returns
because they are unable to capture all of the additional consumer surplus (the consumer
benefits) generated by their innovations. The consumer surplus is lost to the investor
because the innovating firm has to lower prices to sell the product. This lost consumer
surplus dulls the returns from innovation. Furthermore, the innovator has to run the risk of
rivals copying the innovation when there are either no property rights in the innovation, or
the property rights are imperfect in their coverage.
We will build a simple model that examines how trading options on the stock of rival
firms can improve the welfare of society and the returns to investors in the case of
disruptive innovations. We begin with a very simple model (and we later discuss how to
generalise the results). We assume that there are only two players, A and B. A is the
innovating firm that plans to introduce a new cost-reducing disruptive process to the
market. B is the incumbent firm (or group of firms). Since A’s innovation lowers costs, A
anticipates that after launch B’s product prices will fall. Such price behaviour is justified
from theory considerations (Arrow, 1962). This is reinforced by empirical studies which
have observed the negative impact upon an incumbent’s market value that an
announcement of disruptive innovations from rivals (Sundaram et al., 1996), or the actual
launch of rival products that are strategic substitutes of the incumbent’s products (Chen et
al., 2002; Whinston and Collins, 1992).
Definitions. In the first part of the paper we define a bdisruptiveQ innovation as an
innovation that allows a new entrant to supply a product or service at a lower cost than the
established incumbent firms. We later extend our definition of disruptive innovations to
include all innovations that have the potential to alter the price of the stock of an
incumbent firm.
Fig. 1 presents the standard micro-economic treatment of this situation (with the
standard assumption that A exploits its technology and shares the market with B). The
A licenses to B its technology, so that B keeps some profits and shares the market with A.
PRICE 
                       
Old (B) Price 
                                                                                        B’s lost profits won by consumers 
 
New (A) Price 
Old (B) Costs                                                                               
 
New (A) Costs 
QUANTITY 







Fig. 1. Measuring the gains using consumer surplus.
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diagram also allows us to track consumer surplus (which is the consumer’s welfare not
captured by either the producer’s costs or the producer’s profits). The original consumer
surplus before A’s arrival is represented by the area between the upper part of the demand
curve and the old price line (space marked X). Following the entry the consumer surplus
has increased because the price has fallen, and the sum of bB’s lost profitsQ and the area of
the white triangle (space marked Y) represent this. (As is well known, the area of the Y
triangle is small compared to bB’s lost profitsQ.)
We suppose A has a total monopoly on the innovation; that there is no information
leakage; and that B’s stock is traded. When A makes its discovery, there is a time during
which this knowledge is not widely disseminated or appreciated. At that time, when
financiers of A learn about the innovation (via the investment-related contracts they have
with A) they can place a bet on B’s share price falling, buy a derivative instrument on B’s
stock price, or sell the stock of B short. They know that when knowledge of A’s project
becomes widely disseminated, B’s stock price will be adversely affected. The investor can
then realise profits from the arbitrage they have set up.
The instruments available to the investors in A to gather this benefit are quite broad.
They can sell stock short; they can make bets or they can purchase a put option. We can be
more precise. A short sale is exactly equivalent to (1) purchasing a put option plus (2)
selling a call option for the same maturity and strike price less (3) the cash sum of the
strike price discounted at the risk free rate from the time of expiry of the options. This
equivalence is determined by the principles of arbitrage, and is independent of the
assumptions of Black and Scholes (1973).
We will explore later in the paper the various risks from selling short as opposed to
buying puts. Here we merely note that in practice, to limit risk, the investors in A should
purchase a put, a strategy that for a small fee (the loss of the revenues from writing the
call) eliminates the risk of being bwrong footedQ about price changes.
Proposition 1. Investors in companies creating disruptive innovations can improve the
returns to their investment by utilizing asymmetric information and purchasing put options
or similar contracts on the stock of rival firms before knowledge about the success of the
disruptive innovation is widely known.
3.2. Valuing the gains from a theory perspective
Using the concept of consumer surplus, we can quantify the gains. The profit from the
option trading for those investing in A depends on the significance of A’s innovation. We
assume that the innovation is disruptive, but not to the extent of driving B out of business. In
this case, the gains in the option trading will closely reflect B’s lost profits. The more the
innovation affects B’s stock price, the greater the gain to A. In Fig. 1 we assumed for
simplicity that B has a constant average-marginal cost curve.We also assume that A’s project
impinges exactly on B’s space (in economics terms its technology is a perfect substitute). In
this case the lost profits to B are a significant part of the consumer welfare gain. As we show
later, neither of these two assumptions is necessary to obtain the key result.
It may be that A’s innovation is so significant that B is driven out of the market. This
case is shown in Fig. 2. The gains from the put option are no longer equal to the change in
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the consumer surplus, because B’s stock cannot be traded at a negative price. If the market
price falls below the point at which B is driven out A cannot re-capture that portion of the
consumer surplus generated below a zero price for B’s stock.
Providing financial markets accurately gauge B’s losses following A’s entry, then the
gains from the put option to the investors in A represent a large part of the change in
consumer surplus following the disruption by A. This means that the financial
transaction bcompletes the market for knowledgeQ and so provides a source of the
lost profits identified by Arrow (1962). Significantly, apart from the small white triangle
of benefits, there are no other true gains available, for all the consumer surplus is bused
upQ.1
Proposition 1a. The maximum gain to the investor from the exercise of the put option on
the rival firm is roughly equivalent to the un-appropriated consumer surplus following the
launch of the innovation minus the costs of making the put option.
3.3. Generalising the results
Appeal to Coase’s theorem allows us to see the result in a different way and to
appreciate the generalisation of the result (and relaxation of the initial assumptions) to
cases where the innovation is not one of simple cost reduction but includes product and
market innovations. According to Coase (1960) market forces ensure that the optimal
allocation between producer and consumer will occur provided information is perfect and
transactions are costless. Where this is not the case, incomplete contracts between
producer and consumer will lead to sub-optimal allocation. The problem facing A is that
A drives B out of the market.
PRICE 
Old (B) Price 
Old (B) Cost 
New (A) Price 
New (A) Costs  
QUANTITY 
B’s lost profits won by consumers
A’s profits
New consumer surplus lost to
Original Consumer
Fig. 2. Measuring the gains from dramatic innovations using consumer surplus.
1 If B has been able to practice price discrimination among users, by techniques such as tying, metering or
franchising, then the benefits of the welfare triangle are also captured. Such practices are only legal in certain
instances that need not be explored here.
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the value of the discounted cash flow of the project does not capture the value of the
consumer surplus resulting from the introduction of the innovation.
If A can obtain contracts from the customers of B in advance of its innovation, it can
capture the surplus. The extent to which such advance contracts are possible depends on the
extent to which customers believe that innovations will occur without their having to engage
in such contracts. In practice, except where firms are vertically integrated with customers,
constructing contracts with users is very difficult. However, the capital market has clear
expectations about future customer behaviour. The market capitalisation of B reflects the
capital market’s assessment of the loyalty of the customers via the discounted future earnings
of B. In Coase’s terms, purchasing a put option on B forms a contract with speculators about
this loyalty because B’s stockholders already have strong expectations about B’s future
profits from its customers. The put option is a surrogate contract with B’s customers,
overcoming the incomplete contract problem and enabling A to extract the surplus.
Coase’s theorem allows us to appreciate that working the capital markets allows A to
capture the value of the consumer surplus in the more general case. For example, if A’s
innovation impacts many rivals, then buying a set of put options on all of the rivals will
allow A to capture the value of the lost consumer surplus. More importantly, A cannot
capture more consumer surplus than exists, and it will capture (effectively) all there is to be
had (less transactions costs).
Sometimes A will create an innovation that has complementary provider benefits. For
example, if A is innovating a new system for stock trading that benefits the providers of
complementary information such as Reuters, then A can capture some of these gains by
buying call options on the providers of complements. Stock prices of complementary
providers will rise following the announcement. Again, appeal to Coase’s theorem allows
us to see, without complex mathematics, that there is no double counting.
Proposition 1b. In general, where A’s innovation has both complementary and
substitution effects on a variety of other firms (i.e., on stock substitutes), the investors
in A can capture the value of the lost consumer surplus by buying a basket of suitable call
options on complementors and put options on rivals.
3.4. What the consumer surplus argument shows
Propositions 1a and 1b help us measure the potential social benefits of the trades that
the investors undertake. From the investor’s perspective, the financial trade captures most
of the surplus (consumer benefit) that is not captured by A when A sells its disruptive
product in the market. In extreme cases, the options trade makes an unprofitable, but
socially worthwhile, investment realisable. In any case, the options trade yields a more
immediate cash benefit that is additional to the rather uncertain and more distant returns
otherwise inherent in such an investment. Thus there will be cases where the options trade
will allow projects to be financed that could not be financed otherwise (except perhaps by
government subsidy). As noted above, such cases will improve society’s welfare (as seen
by the economist’s measure of consumer surplus).
Who pays for the trades? The consumer does not pay directly; it is the issuers of the
instruments. In most markets, the sellers of put options and derivative instruments are
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pension funds, who undertake the positions in the hope of increasing their returns. Where
pension funds represent the same class of consumers as the future users of B’s current
products, the put option is a surrogate contract with B’s customers. In other cases, pension
funds or speculators are merely standing in for the consumers. In Coase’s terms, we are
bridging the financial markets for B with the asset markets for A’s invention.
It must be stressed at this point that there is a big difference between trading in
derivatives on rival companies (stock substitutes) to help finance innovations and the use
of insider knowledge to reap personal gain. Societal gains from insider trading are usually
measured in terms of more efficient trading on financial markets and more efficient
signals. These gains are widely disputed, have significant agency problems and create
ethical concerns. In contrast, trading by investors in stock substitutes to help finance
disruptive innovations is more clearly socially beneficial in the sense that there are no
agency problems. The profits earned from these trades directly and unambiguously benefit
financiers of the innovation process, thus solving the dilemma observed by Arrow (1962).
Moreover the economist’s metrics allowing us to judge these benefits are rooted in a long
tradition of welfare calculations used by economists since Alfred Marshall.
In summary, the use of options augments value. Judging a venture investment solely on
the basis of its expected cash flows would be misleading if the gains to be made from the
exploitation of rivals’ losses were not taken into account. Further, disregard of these gains
can lead to sub-optimal returns to the investor. In the final analysis it is the combination of
the value of the discounted cash flow (DCF) of the investment and the gains from the
paired action in the financial markets which determines the true value of a potential
investment in the disruptive innovator, A.
4. Importance of the put option relative to the DCF
How important is the value of trading the financial options we propose relative to the
profits from the underlying disruptive investment? The answer is that the value could be
very large. Profits from the option trade could be many times the total future profits
from the original investments in the company undertaking the disruption. We begin by
looking at four case examples: airlines, computer peripherals, medical devices and drugs.
Then we look at empirical papers that have observed the negative impact that
announcement of new potential or actual disruptions have upon the market capitalisation
of incumbents.
Whinston and Collins (1992) monitored the effect of 24 announcements by the airline
People Express. Each announcement was a stated intention to enter new US domestic
routes between two cities during 1984–1985. They found that each announcement had a
significant negative effect on the market capitalisation of incumbents and a significant
positive effect on the price of People Express’s stock. The fall in any given incumbent’s
stock price was about four times larger than the gain in stock price experienced by People
Express at the time of the launch. This suggests that the potential gain from trading put
options (or some equivalent derivative) may be larger than the potential gains from the
DCF of the investment itself. Even more critically, the gains from the put arise
immediately, whereas the project gains (from the management perspective) are spread over
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the life of the project. To reinforce the point, we know that investors in People Express
ultimately lost money on their shares, but they could still have made a profit if they had
been able to undertake the financial play.
In 1987, a venture capital-backed company named Phoenix Technologies, then private,
announced that it was planning to launch a product that would disrupt Adobe’s postscript
printer technology. On the announcement, Adobe’s stock dropped over 36% over a 2-
month period. Investors in Phoenix Technologies could have increased their return by
purchasing at a suitable time a put on Adobe’s stock (provided they did not have any other
relationship with Adobe, see the regulatory section below).
In the medical device industry, on September 17, 2003 it became clear that a device
called a bdrug-eluting stentQ from Boston Scientific would be a disruptive technology to
a division within the giant pharmaceutical company Johnson and Johnson. The stock of
J&J fell 1.4% in 15 min and 2.5% in that day. Moreover, the stock price of the S&P
600 Smaller Cap SurModics (Nasdaq: SRDX) dropped 13.7% that day because, at the
time, SurModics supplied the technology to J&J that was used in its bdrug-eluting
stentQ. (The stock in Boston Scientific was suspended during the announcement period.)
Investors in Boston Scientific, after taking appropriate precautions, could have increased
their wealth by purchasing put options on either SurModics or on J&J at the appropriate
time.
An example of complementary benefits can be seen in the pharmaceutical case of Barr
Laboratories. On July 12, 2001, Aai Pharma announced that it had received a US patent
for a form of fluoxetine, the active ingredient in Prozac. Aai Pharma also announced that it
had licensed fluoxetine to Eli Lilly for marketing. Eli Lilly simultaneously announced its
decision not to request FDA (Food and Drug Administration) approval for the new form of
Prozac thereby opening the door for the production of generics to Prozac. The combined
effect of the two announcements was both complementary and threatening. Barr
Laboratories found themselves first-to-market in the US with a generic rival to Prozac.
Barr’s stock jumped 10% in the first day, and a further 24% during the following 42-day
period. Eli Lilly’s shares lost nearly 2% in the first day. Borrowing from data supplied by
John Graham (Fraser Forum: September, 23 2000) we can see that the investors in Barr
gained about $34 millions whereas the investors in Eli Lilly lost more than $1 billions,
once again showing that the wealth impact on the disrupted firm can be much greater than
that accruing to the disruptor.
In each of the above cases, the investors in the companies creating the disruptive
innovations potentially had early insights into the market dynamics. These insights, whilst
not absolutely guaranteed in their effect, provided solid investment opportunities for the
investors to increase their returns.
Sundaram et al. (1996) examined the impact that 106 announcements of changes in
R&D activities by firms from 18 industries had on both the firm and its rival. They found
that where the R&D activity was characterized as generating possible strategic substitutes
to incumbent firms products that the incumbents experienced negative and statistically
significant reductions in stock market value. The announcing firm experienced significant,
positive rises in market value.
Building on the work of Sundaram et al. (1996), Chen et al. (2002) provide further
support for the effect of announcements on the stock price of disrupted firms. Employing a
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dataset of 384 new product announcements by firms from 39 industries, they found that
where a new product launch announcement was viewed as a strategic substitute for an
incumbent product, the incumbent experienced negative and statistically significant
reductions in its stock market value within a narrow 2-day window. The announcements
studied by Chen et al. (2002) were not just disruptive technologies but also non-disruptive
ones too, the competitors were defined by a wide industry definition rather than a narrow
product-based criterion, and the test of the price fall was restricted to a narrow 2-day
window in comparison to a 260-day benchmark which might be more typical of an options
contract. The test is therefore much more demanding than that which our investors need. It
should also be noted that in each of these studies, many of the firms were diversified and
that diversification had no effect on the issue at stake.
Proposition 1c. Placing options contracts under conditions of asymmetric market
information has the potential to increase the returns to investors in innovations many
times, where the benchmark is the DCF of the investment solely in the innovation itself
without capitalising on externalities.
This brings us to another point: investors in firm A may not be confident that it will
succeed in disrupting B, but they can still benefit from the asymmetric information if A has
many close rivals also working on the same challenge. Disruptive innovators come in
packs; typically there are many firms working on parallel tracks. Realization that a
breakthrough is about to occur may persuade the market that B’s value is under-threat even
if the market may not know which of the firms in the pack will win. Studies of disruptive
innovations, such as by Christensen (1997), give examples of these phenomena.
5. Timing, information leakage, transactions costs and uncertainty
Until now we have ignored several important factors such as the carrying costs of
purchasing options, the danger of information leakage from the disrupting company, the
volatility of the stock price of the disrupted company and uncertainty over the effects of
the disclosure. These factors might interact in a damaging manner to affect both the size of
the gains and the timing of investors moves. For example, if the rival firm B has a very
volatile stock price, due to other factors such as raw material price volatility, and if the
time between buying the option and cashing in the bet is long, there is a danger that the
price of the stock will rise on account of other factors even after the market has taken
account of the bad news. We will deal with the problem in several stages. First, what are
the chances of making a profit on the derivative trade for a given situation? Then, what
factors determine the timing of the buying, holding and selling of the derivative?
5.1. Price volatility
First, we note that we must consider the volatility of the stock price of the rival firm on
whose stock we place the trade. A higher volatility means a better chance of the price
rising in such a way as to nullify the effect of our announcement. We also note that there is
a volatility of the expected effect of the announcement. If the information we release to the
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market is ambiguous, the market may not react as much as we hoped and so the gains may
be less. If E is the expected value to be gained from depressing the stock price of B the
disrupted firm, and c the transactions cost of the put and T the time that the option is left
open, then the expected return can be stated as:
Gain is : E  cT ð1Þ
Sophisticated investors who are rich (as is often the case) will clearly take into account
that any put option has a chance of making a gain. Indeed, the typical sophisticated
investor is likely to assume the options are correctly priced by the market; and that the true
transactions costs are actually much less than the price of the put, even approaching zero.
Such an investor (say a typical venture fund) is therefore unlikely to perceive much
downside risk from the speculative trade. Moreover, if the investor acts like a venture fund
the risk will be one that is well understood and no more risky than many other investments
that the fund makes. E may turn out to be small, but if c is small nothing will be lost.
In contrast, the naı¨ve risk-averse investor will not only be interested in the expected
gain, but also concerned with the likelihood of a loss, and may take a much more
conservative view. To this investor, c d T may not be a trivial sum. The likelihood of loss is
dependent on the volatility of the stock price of the rivals B and the volatility of the
effectiveness of the announcement E as well as the size of c d T. As a first-order
approximation, these risks work in an additive manner (because they are independent
events). Let us use a simple example of the naı¨ve risk-averse investor wishing to be 95%
certain of making a gain to see how the numbers work out. If SB is the standard deviation
of the variation of the price of B per period and if SA is the standard deviation of the
expected effect of the announcement (which is absolute) then the investor wanting to limit
risk to 5% should play as long as:
EN2SAþ 2SBþ cð ÞT ð2Þ
5.2. Determinants of the timing
The size of T is a critical factor in the potential profits of the trade and the risk of the
trade. A short T limits transactions costs and risk. A long T has the opposite effect. What
determines the value of T? The simple answer detailed below is that T is determined by an
interaction between the carrying costs of the put and the rate at which information is
leaked. (Once the information is leaked, the market reacts speedily.) Even in semi-efficient
capital markets all public announcement that impact on the present and future earnings of a
stock is promptly absorbed via changes in the stock price (Fama, 1991). A number of
studies have observed that the effects are almost complete within as little as 2 days in the
case of stock substitutes (Chen et al., 2002; Sundaram et al., 1996.) And, as noted above,
the carrying costs for the put are comparatively less for the sophisticated investor than the
naı¨ve one.
Fig. 3 shows the issues and solution to the effect of carrying costs and information
leakage diagrammatically. On the vertical axis we plot the cumulative value of the
information to the various parties and the cost of the put, which we assume as constant
over time. Time is shown horizontally. The cumulative value of the information is
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measured as the total impact on the market capitalisation of the disrupted firm B. As noted,
we assume that the true impact of the information is clear to the investors of the innovating
firm prior to its becoming clear to the financial markets (in particular the stockholders of
B). Our diagram shows the typical S shaped information curve, but the curve could have
any shape. It also shows that the diffusion (of the significance of the) information between
A and B’s stockholders occurs at a constant rate; again this is only for ease of exposition
and does not affect the result. The important point is that there is some time lag between
the two curves.
From the figure it is easy to see that gains are maximised by buying the put at the
earliest point in time where the value of asymmetric information is equal to the cost of
carrying the put. Likewise, the best moment to sell is when the two are again equal.
Optimal purchase of the put is not at the point at which asymmetric information is at its
greatest, as the casual observer may have expected. We can generalise our result to the
standard first-order derivative equation summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2. The optimal strategy for the investors in A is to purchase the put when the
value of the information asymmetry just rises above the carrying cost of the put. Likewise,
the investors in A should sell the put when the value of the information asymmetry falls to
just below the carrying cost.
In practice, knowledge of potentially disruptive innovations is often well known before
the market takes notice. There are many smaller companies experimenting with
innovations at any one time. Their investors attend board meetings and conduct regular
discussions with management. These sources of information give company A’s investors
regular feedback on the company’s prospects relative to that of its competitors. The
moment when industry conferences give platform visibility to the activities of these firms
is when the knowledge becomes effective and is noticed by financial markets. Another
way of gaining attention is to form an alliance with credible partners. The stock market has
reacted positively to announcements of alliance formation by small firms with larger
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Fig. 3. Information asymmetry and transactions costs.
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partners (Chan et al., 1997; Das et al., 1998; Koh and Venkatraman, 1991.) This means
that in practice there is a long time during which the investors in the disruptive technology
have a moment to place their bets.
What are the approximate transactions costs one might expect? To provide a tangible
example of a real venture situation, we give some data for investors in a new book-selling
business trading put options on a well-traded stock substitute that has a narrow portfolio—
Barnes and Noble. We looked at Barnes and Noble (www.ee-online.com) (symbol: BKS)
put options with various expiration dates on August 23rd, 1999, when BKS’s $25 stock
price was equivalent to the strike price of the options. BKS options with 2-month, 5-month
and 8-month expirations became profitable with only 2% stock-price drops. Indeed,
suppose one was to believe that the announcement could move the stock price of BKS by
say 6% in 1–2 months, or 13% in 5–8 months, then this example indicates a potential to
earn greater than 30% cash-on-cash returns; and very high internal rates of return (480%
and 150%, respectively). It is easy to see that a modest outlay in this arena would greatly
improve the return on the venture investment as a whole.
6. Regulatory and legal issues
Some have expressed concern that our proposed strategies for the investors are not
legal. The concerns centre on the fact that investors in A are using non-public
information to make a gain on the change in the stock price of the threatened firm B. In
other words, the use of bmaterial, non-public informationQ gained through an investment
in a bDisruptive private company AQ would violate insider trading laws related to
trading publicly traded stock in bThe disrupted public company B.Q We have carefully
trawled the insider trading statutes in the US, and have discussed our example with
lawyers and experts. Whilst we are not legal scholars, there is clear U.S. Supreme Court
case law and commentary to support our position that the strategy we propose is legal.
We particularly refer to United States v. O’Hagan (1997) and to Ayres and Bankman
(2001), who explicitly discuss the legality of trading in stock substitutes. Neither the
Supreme Court case nor Ayres and Bankman discuss our example of venture investors
increasing their returns to help finance disruptive innovations, but they both discuss the
more general case of holders of material, non-public information on a company with
which they have no legal connection who choose to trade on that information for
personal benefit.
6.1. SEC Statutes
Because we are dealing with legal issues, it is necessary to use some legal terminology
that clarifies the situation more exactly and supports our view that the legality is robust.
The applicable United States Statute is Rule 10(b)-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. This rule states that one cannot bengage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. . .Q However, as far as our case is concerned, to
infringe this law, one must either be privy to material, non-public information known to
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insiders in bDisrupted public company BQ or one must have misappropriated material, non-
public information about bDisrupted public company BQ (unknown to insiders) from an
boutsiderQ who is somehow the owner of such information.
Our investors in the disruptive company A should not fall foul of any of the SEC rules
if they take care of the following: (i) they must owe no duty to B or have any temporary or
permanent relationship to B—this means that the investors in A must take care not to be
employed by B, or be directors of B, or to have any trading arrangement with B; and (ii)
they must likewise make sure that they owe no temporary or permanent duty to any trading
partner of B; such as being a director of a major B supplier; and (iii) they must also be sure
that company A itself owes no duty to disrupted company B or has any temporary or
permanent trading relationship with company B (i.e., company B is an unrelated player in
the market competing directly or indirectly with company A). In other words, the investor
must not have any direct or indirect relationship with company B which would subject the
investor to insider trading restrictions when trading on public company B’s stock. The only
other issue of concern is that investors in A have a duty to company A itself if these
investors use A’s non-public information. This duty is not necessarily broken just because
the investors use this information for personal gain. The key is to ensure that the investors
do not misappropriate the information about A.
When venture investors invest in a new company, it is typically the case that they
request many investor rights as part of their investment. These investor rights are
summarized in a document called a bterms sheetQ for the investment offer. The terms sheet
becomes the basis for all final investment documents. To make sure that the venture
investors in A are not deemed to have misappropriated information by later trading on
such information learned through their company A-related investment activities, venture
investors should simply request explicit permission to use such information as part of their
investment term sheets.2
6.2. US Supreme Court
The reader should note that it is not enough to read the SEC statutes, one must also
study how the courts interpret the law. Here we are fortunate to be guided by a whole
series of U.S. Supreme Court judgments that reinforce our viewpoint.
Cady, Roberts (1961) established the duty of some parties such as a brokerage firm
employee, to either disclose material, non-public information or abstain from trading. Two
other cases: Investors Management Co (1971) and Oppenheimer and Co (1976) gave
further weight to this case and better defined the types of insider information triggering the
bdisclose or abstain to tradeQ prohibitions.
2 One venture investment organization who gave feedback on the ideas in this paper has started using the
following language in the bConfidentialityQ sections of their terms sheets: bIt is understood and agreed that the
Investors may learn material non-public information about third-party public and/or private companies who are
competitors, suppliers, investors, partners, or customers of the Company as a result of their serving on the Board,
or as an investor in the Company. The Company hereby expressly disclaims any and all representations and
warranties with respect to such material non-public information, including but not limited to warranties of
accuracy and completeness; but grants to Investors unrestricted rights to use such information about third parties,
if any, without notifying the Company.Q
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InChiarella (1980), and Dirks (1983), the Supreme Court reinforced the line of reason-
ing, rejecting the contention that bmere possession of material nonpublic informationQ im-
poses upon the possessor a fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain from trading. In doing so, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that for a Section 10(b) violation there must be a special relation-
ship between the corporation’s shareholders and the person trading on inside information.
Newman (1981) and Materia (1985) established more clearly the bmisappropriation
theoryQ. These cases changed the focus of Section 10(b) away from the defrauded purchaser
or seller of securities and instead focused on the trader’s relationship to the entity from
which the information was obtained. Although there was no fraud perpetrated by Newman
or Materia against the buyers/sellers of any securities, those cases identified a duty running
between the defendants and the entities that were connected in some way to the securities
transaction from which the defendants wrongly profited. In our proposed transaction, we
stress that the investors in A must take care (inter-alia) to have cleared their relationship
with A and by implication with the other investors in A about the use of the information.
Carpenter (1986) expanded on Newman and Materia. There was no confidential
information breached related to the corporation’s securities. The only breach was that
Winans, a writer for the Wall Street Journal (and his tipee Carpenter), misappropriated for
personal profit the newspaper’s publishing schedule giving them information about stocks
that were to be covered in its bHeard on the StreetQ column. The Second Circuit Court used
Carpenter to increase the scope of misappropriation theory related to securities fraud, but
the US Superior Court was split and issued no opinion on the securities fraud aspects of
the case. Instead, Carpenter was convicted of mail fraud.
O’Hagan (1997) is the latest Supreme Court ruling and defines current US law. It
reaffirmed the misappropriation theory and boutlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic
information by a corporate doutsiderT in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party,
but to the source of the information.Q The majority of the Supreme Court justices
conceded that bif Mr. O’Hagan had informed his law firm of his intention to use the
misappropriated information to trade on the target stock, there would have been no
Section 10(b) violationQ. Justice Thomas pointed out that the fraud was to a third
party—and not to a party to the securities transaction. Thus the justices explicitly
discuss situations that encompass the strategies proposed in this paper.
In summary, the long line of judgments of the Supreme Court appear to indicate that, at
this point in time, an investor in a disruptive innovating company A can use bmaterial,
nonpublic informationQ to trade in stock of disrupted rival company B under Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provided of course that the investor has no
conflicting fiduciary duty to either firm.
7. Discussion
According to March (1991) and Levinthal and March (1993), entrepreneurs find their
opportunities for innovation are limited because investors in entrepreneurial projects find it
hard to achieve satisfactory returns on projects that break new ground, such as
development of new products, processes, markets and/or new organizational forms. Even
though these investments may have significant impacts in the markets where they appear
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that may benefit consumers and society, they carry high risk (Bebchuk and Fershtman,
1994) and there are reasons to assume that the internal rates of return may be poor (Teece,
1984; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Burgelman, 1994; Barnett et al., 1994). The problems do not
just relate to ventures in the domestic arena, they could be applied to situations of
internationalization (Jaffe et al., 2005).
This paper explains how investors in entrepreneurial projects can raise their returns.
This not only benefits the investors, and entrepreneurs that are looking for financing,
but ultimately the final consumer of the new, disruptive product or service. Our core
idea is options management, but our approach differs from the previous literature on
real options in the strategy field. We identify the availability of an embedded real option
that is present within investments made by early stage investors in disruptive innovative
companies. In our paper, this embedded real option to purchase a derivative in a stock
substitute bridges the financial and real asset markets by enabling the investors in
disruptive company A to create a contract, effectively, with the customers of disrupted
company B just prior to the point in time when the disruption will occur.
Our suggested use of financial options instruments to bridge the financial and real asset
markets supports the real options approach to increasing value by flexibility as noted by
Leslie and Michaels (1997), Dixit and Pindyck (1994, 1997), and Luerhman (1997, 1998).
And our ideas are consistent with the logic of firms developing a portfolio of new ideas
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; MacMillan and McGrath, 2000; McGrath and MacMillan,
2000; Boisot and MacMillan, 2005).
The idea that investors can use financial markets to increase value has a parallel line
of reasoning in the alliance literature. Writers such as Teece (1996) have long stressed
the importance of complementary assets and their role in risky projects has been
explored (Kogut, 1991; Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Sanchez, 1993; and most notably,
Miller and Waller, 2003; McGrath, 1999). Yet partnerships have a downside. They are
notorious for their lack of clear governance mechanisms when compared with
ownership contracts. The success of alliances formed by firms is reported by managers
to be as low as 50% (Kale et al., 2002). There is a chance that the agreement will
incur high costs if a party does not deliver. The relatively high rate of alliance failure
can be associated with the specific relational risks of partner opportunism, conflicting
objectives, and misunderstandings that arise in addition to the standard performance
risks that all entrepreneurial business activities face (Das and Teng, 2000). The need to
create mechanisms such as trust to overcome these risks has been stressed by Powell
(1990) and Ring and Van de Ven (1992). Although contracts can be written to try to
prevent such events, the contracts are typically incomplete and hard to enforce.
Our use of financial options markets to raise value does not go against any of these
moves, but has many intrinsic benefits that are not shown in alliance contracts. Options
contracts are simple, well regulated and have the merit that there is a secure counter party
that delivers the benefits.
7.1. Practical considerations
Can our suggested practices really work, and is it important for investors to add
protections we suggest to their investment documents? We have noted that the frequency
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of the opportunity for the investor to undertake the proposed financial plays is rare. The
new venture must have a new product, process, channel of distribution or some other angle
that is clearly bdisruptiveQ to established firms. Most new ventures never find themselves
in that position, but a few do. For these few, our strategy is meaningful. The returns are
frequency multiplied by value, frequency may be low but value is very large and so the
potential profits from our strategy are significant.
Our work helps add to the standard terms all investors should consider when structuring
their investments. It is common for investors to include covenants in their terms sheets to
handle situations where the occurrence is rare, but where the financial impacts are
significant. These covenants become part of the boilerplate used for all investments.
Examples of such boilerplate covenants include: redemption provisions, requirements for
key man insurance, S-3 registration rights, auditing requirements, penalties for violating
confidentiality terms, and so on. To take advantage of the opportunities we describe, given
the financial impact preserved by protecting for this possibility, we propose that investors
draft boilerplate language (such as that cited in footnote 2 above) to cover this situation as
well.
We have undertaken extensive discussions with entrepreneurs and venture investors
about our proposed ideas. They are very guarded (for tax and other reasons) about
admitting to undertaking our strategy. But a few have clearly done so to a considerable
profit. The majority of investors we meet believe our ideas are practical and will work, for
they can clearly point to situations in the past where they could have made the kinds of
profits we are discussing. Moreover, these investors are using provisions, such as the one
cited, in their term sheets for new investments. Actions speak loudly; our proposal is not a
mere academic pipedream but something that has practical meaning.
8. Conclusions
In the last decade capital markets have developed considerably and are more willing to
finance risky young ventures. This has gone a long way to improving the ability of
entrepreneurs to raise financing for ventures that will improve society by improving
consumer choice. The emergence of NASDAQ in the USA, AIM in London and the
Neuer Markt in Germany have provided a forum where owners of new firms can
capitalise on future uncertain profit streams and raise immediate capital on their explo-
ratory ideas.
This paper goes one step further by explaining how vibrant capital markets can provide
another effective mechanism for assisting ventures. When private investors fund a venture
that poses a significant entry threat to established firms, the investor may purchase a put
option on its rival and so secure additional returns to its as yet unannounced innovation.
Upon announcement, the reaction of the market in terms of the stock price generates an
immediate gain for the investor in the innovating firm. The investor does not have to wait
for project completion before reaping any reward. This added feedback is potentially short
and very powerful.
In the context of the entrepreneurship literature we place our contribution as a new
strand of thinking that bridges entrepreneurship, finance and strategy. Our paper provides
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guidance on the moral, legal–regulatory and practical aspects of the proposed strategies.
We believe that we have given a new dimension of financial strategy for venture finance
and a fruitful avenue for discussion and research.
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